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SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., 
a corporation; VAL E. 
SOUTHWICK; et al., 
Defendants-
Respondents . 
Case No. 870121 
Category 14b 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs1 Complaint on defen-
dants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This is an appeal as of right 
from that ruling. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where a note secured by a trust deed and by certain 
letters of credit provides for partial reconveyances upon payment 
of specified portions of principal, and where the letters of 
credit are called and applied to the principal by reason of the 
promissors1 failure to make other payments, are the promissors 
entitled to the corresponding partial reconveyances? 
2. Does an accord and satisfaction exist as a matter of law 
where one party to a real estate transaction claims an entitlement 
to a reconveyance of a certain number of lots, and the trustee and 
beneficiaries repeatedly refuse to reconvey those lots but finally 
agree to reconvey a portion of the lots? 
3. Are the covenants of good faith and fair dealing 
breached where the trustors make an oral demand for release of 
certain lots to which they are entitled, and where the beneficiar-
ies know of circumstances which make the release of those lots by 
a certain date necessary in order to prevent severe economic 
injury to the trustors, but nonetheless fail to secure a recon-
veyance of the lots by the required date? 
4. Did a genuine issue of fact exist precluding summary 
judgment on plaintiffs1 claim that the contract was unconscionable 
where the lender failed to disclose material terms in advance of 
closing and by reason of the lender's delay in closing the 
borrower had no viable alternative but to execute the contract, 
and where the terms of the contract are unfair and oppressive? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, This is an action by the trustors 
under a trust deed and note for breach of contract by the benefi-
2 
ciaries. The trustors, in addition, sought reformation of the 
contract, to quiet title to the underlying real property, and 
recover damages for breach of fiduciary duties and for filing a 
wrongful notice of default. 
B. Course of Proceedings, Plaintiffs commenced this action 
by filing their Complaint on February 12, 1986. (R. 1.) Defen-
dant J. Scott Beuhler filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
November 3, 1986 (R. 614), and the damage claims against him were 
dismissed pursuant to stipulation. (R. 697-98, 699-700.) All of 
the defendants, except Beuhler, (hereinafter "defendants") had 
previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 17, 
1986. (R. 390-92.) The Hon. Richard C. Davidson, District Judge, 
considered the matter on the briefs and entered a ruling dismiss-
ing plaintiffs1 Complaint in its entirety on January 27, 1987. 
(R. 945.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) to 
vacate the judgment (R. 977) and obtained an extension of time to 
appeal pending ruling on the motion for relief from the judgment. 
(R. 986.) The matter was heard by the Hon. Boyd Bunnell, District 
Judge, who entered a ruling denying the motion for relief from the 
judgment on March 18, 1987. (R. 1097.) Plaintiffs thereafter 
perfected this appeal. (R. 1101.) 
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C. Statement of Facts. This action involves certain 
agreements plaintiffs entered into with Summit Systems, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Summit") in order to finance the development of a 
75-acre subdivision known as Yellow Hills located near Vernal, 
Utah. Robert Kay, as nominee, purchased the land1 on January 20, 
1983, from Clive Sprouse for $350,000.00. (Clive Sprouse deposi-
tion at Exhibit 1.) Plaintiffs thereafter spent approximately 
$110,000.00 in engineering and surveying work and road construc-
tion. (L. Kay depo at p. 43.) 
In October or November of 1983, plaintiffs sought to obtain 
financing for the project from Summit. (L. Kay depo at p. 56.) 
The Yellow Hills property, at that time, had an appraised value of 
approximately $1,518,000.00 (L. Kay depo at Ex. 9 (appraisal dated 
November 3, 1983)), and it appeared that lots would be readily 
marketable. (L. Kay depo at Ex. 2.) Summit agreed to extend a 
loan for approximately $800,000.00 if certain requirements were 
met. (L. Kay depo at p. 56.) 
At the time plaintiffs applied for a loan from Summit, they 
already had existing obligations of $250,000.00 to Clive Sprouse 
for the balance of the purchase price of the land, $110,000.00 to 
xRobert Kay purchased approximately 175 acres but only 
approximately 75 acres were developable. (Deposition of Lawrence 
Kay, June 12, 1986, (hereinafter "L. Kay depo") at p. 20, 1. 22 
through p. 21, 1. 4 .) 
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First Security Bank for a development loan on the project, and 
$135,000.00 for another development loan. (L. Kay depo at pp. 60-
62, 66, Ex. 1.) Summit delayed the closing of the loan for a 
couple of months (L. Kay depo at p. 56) , and by the time the 
closing occurred, the Sprouse and First Security Bank obligations 
were past due. (L. Kay depo at pp. 61, 84.) 
Although plaintiffs had been previously advised that there 
would be a "discount" (i.e., the face amount of the loan would be 
greater than the amount actually disbursed), plaintiffs had 
understood the discount would be approximately 10% and that the 
interest rate would be approximately 10%. (R. 499, 524.) The 
plaintiffs were not informed until closing that the discount would 
be $12 3,000.00, or approximately 17%, and in addition that the 
interest rate would be 17%. (R. 500, 525.) Plaintiffs objected 
to the discount rate and interest rate, but upon discovering that 
Summit would not negotiate the terms, the plaintiffs signed the 
documents because they had no reasonable alternative at that time 
due to the delay in closing the loan and the resulting delinquency 
of the obligations to Clive Sprouse and to First Security Bank. 
(L. Kay depo at pp. 93-94.) Plaintiffs received the sum of 
$667,000.00, but under the trust deed and note were required to 
pay $806,000.00 plus interest at 17%. (R. 19-23.) (Copies of the 
5 
trust deed and trust deed note are attached hereto as Appendices 
"B" and "C" respectively. 
In connection with obtaining the loan, plaintiffs were 
required to execute a trust deed for the Yellow Hills property in 
favor of Summit as beneficiary, and in addition to post three 
letters of credit with a total value of $280,000,00. Plaintiffs 
were concerned about the effect of calling the letters of credit, 
particularly with respect to reconveyances of lots. Plaintiffs 
were assured by Val Southwick, president of Summit, that the 
appropriate number of lots would be reconveyed upon the calling of 
a letter of credit, the same as with other payments of principal. 
(R. 500-01, 525-26; L. Kay depo at pp. 91, 93, 95, 117; Robert Kay 
depo dated June 12, 1986 (hereinafter "R. Kay depo"), at pp. 32-
33, 35; Marva Joy Kay depo at p. 13; Teresa Kay depo at pp. 9-10.) 
The beneficial interest under the trust deed was subsequently 
assigned by Summit to various investors, each of which are named 
as parties defendant in this action. Plaintiffs were not informed 
of the assignments and did not discover that they had occurred 
until after the trustee had recorded a notice of default with 
respect to the loan. (R. 502, 527.) 
The trust deed stated that the first payment was due on June 
1, 1986. Because of the uneven number of days for which interest 
6 
was due, however, Summit had agreed to compute the exact amount of 
the payment due and to advise plaintiffs. (R. 503, 528.) 
Plaintiffs paid the amount due on or about June 19, 1986, which 
was within ten days of receiving notice from Summit of the amount 
due. (L. Kay depo at Ex. 8; R. 473 at para. 13.) Plaintiffs did 
not make the payment which was due September 1, 1984, and Summit 
accordingly called one of the letters of credit from First 
Security Bank for $110,000.00. (R. 473 at para. 13.) Plaintiffs 
also did not make the payment due December 1, 1984, and Summit 
called and drew upon the two remaining letters of credit, from 
First Interstate Bank in the total amount of $170,000.00. (Id.) 
As a result of the calling of the letters of credit, ap-
proximately $2 00,000.00 was paid against the principal amount of 
the loan. Plaintiffs accordingly, on January 10, 1986, sent a 
written request to Summit for release of 12 lots.2 (L. Kay depo 
at p. 118, Ex. 13; R. Kay depo at p. 46.) Summit received the 
letter (id.), but failed to release any lots. Plaintiffs had 
disclosed, while negotiating for the loan and at closing, that 
they were dependent upon timely releases and sales of lots in 
order to make the payments due under the trust deed and trust deed 
2The trust deed provided in paragraph 22(a) for the release 
of one of each of the specified lots upon receipt of $15,000.00 
for each lot to be reconveyed. A payment of $180,000.00 in 
principal would have entitled plaintiffs under this provision to a 
release of 12 lots. 
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note. (L. Kay depo at 69.) Plaintiffs had several parties who 
has expressed a genuine interest in purchase of lots, but plain-
tiffs were never able to solicit any written offers because they 
did not have any lots to sell. (L. Kay depo at 72-73.) Plain-
tiffs were able to make the payment due March 1, 1986, but were 
not able to make the payment due June 1, 198 6. 
Subsequent to the Jamiary 10, 1985, written demand for 
release of lots, plaintiffs made numerous oral demands for lot 
releases. (R. 503-04, 528-29.) Plaintiffs also explored several 
alternatives for arranging a purchase of the entire subdivision by 
other parties in order that plaintiffs could satisfy the obliga-
tion to Summit. About May 1, 1985, Southwick finally acknowledged 
that Summit was obligated to reconvey some lots to plaintiffs and 
in the middle of May agreed to reconvey 7 specified lots. (R. 
504, 529.) Plaintiffs confirmed that agreement by a letter dated 
June 2, 1985. (R. Kay depo at p. 47.) 
At about the same time, plaintiffs had negotiated a sale of 
the entire subdivision back to Clive Sprouse. The sale was 
contingent, however, on the release of 7 lots by June 24, 1985. 
(R. 504, 529.) Plaintiffs informed Southwick of the need to have 
the lots released by June 24. (Id.) The 7 lots were not, 
however, released until after July 1, 1985. (R. 489.) Plaintiffs 
immediately contacted Mr. Sprouse to determine if he would still 
8 
purchase the subdivision, but he had lost interest in the project 
and would not extend the deadline in his prior offer. (L. Kay 
depo at p. 142.) Plaintiffs thereafter commenced this litigation 
to recover the damages they had incurred and for a declaration of 
their rights. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trust deed provided for partial reconveyances of one lot 
for each $15,000.00 of principal paid. By reason of the calling 
of certain letters of credit, plaintiffs paid over $200,000.00 in 
principal and were entitled to an appropriate release of lots. 
Even though the letters of credit were called and applied to the 
principal by reason of a claimed default by plaintiffs, case law 
establishes that plaintiffs were still entitled to the reconvey-
ances where the trust deed did not make the reconveyances contin-
gent on the absence of default. 
The primary basis for the trial court's dismissal of plain-
tiffs1 Complaint was its determination that an accord and satis-
faction had been reached. The only evidence to support this 
determination was the fact that a demand for release of a reduced 
number of lots had been made and complied with. There was no 
evidence, however, of any intent to waive the balance of the 
initial demand, and in fact there was substantial evidence that 
9 
there was no such intent. The resolution of this factual dispute 
by summary judgment was improper. 
Even if an executory accord or an accord and satisfaction 
were reached, defendants breached the agreement and breached their 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to reconvey the 
lots by a critical deadline of which defendants were aware. 
Finally, the entire transaction was unconscionable. The 
interest rate and discount were grossly unreasonable and unfair in 
view of the value of the security. Plaintiffs had no meaningful 
alternative to entering the contract because they had foregone 
pursuit of other financing in reliance upon the representation 
that Summit would extend financing on certain terms, but they were 
not informed until closing that the terms were much more oppres-
sive than initially represented, and because the underlying 
obligations were in default as a result of delays in closing. The 




DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO 
RECONVEY LOTS IN RESPONSE TO THE JANUARY 10, 1985 
DEMAND. 
The trust deed which is the subject of this action provided, 
in paragraph 22, that plaintiffs were entitled to a reconveyance 
10 
of specified lots upon receipt of $15,000.00 for each lot recon-
veyed. (A complete copy of the trust deed is attached hereto as 
Appendix B.) As of January 4, 1985, the principal obligation 
secured by the trust deed had been reduced to $605,972.17, a 
reduction of $200,027.83 from the initial principal balance of 
$806,000.00. (R. 479.) Although the large reduction in principal 
had resulted mainly from the proceeds of three letters of credit 
in the total amount of $280,000.00 which had been called by 
defendants, plaintiffs nonetheless were entitled, by reason of 
representations made by Summit at the time the loan was closed and 
by the terms of the trust deed itself, to a reconveyance of an 
appropriate number of lots. On January 10, 1985, plaintiffs 
accordingly made a written demand on Summit for a release of 12 
specified lots. Pursuant to the terms of the trust deed, 
plaintiffs would have been entitled to the release of those lots 
upon payment of $180,000.00 in principal; plaintiffs had paid over 
$200,000.00 in principal and should have been entitled to a 
release of 13 lots. Summit, however, refused to release any lots. 
Summit's wrongful refusal to release the lots was the 
specific subject of Count II of plaintiffs1 Complaint herein and 
was implicitly the subject of most of the other claims raised in 
plaintiffs1 Complaint, including specifically Counts V, VI, and 
VII. The trial court dismissed Counts II, V, VI, and VII of the 
11 
Complaint based upon a claimed accord and satisfaction, and 
accordingly did not decide the issue of whether defendants had 
breached the contract by failing to reconvey the lots. Point II 
below establishes that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
Complaint based on the claim of accord and satisfaction. 
The subject of lot releases was of critical importance to 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs1 ability to make the required payments 
under the trust deed note were dependent to a large extent on 
plaintiffs obtaining money from the sales of released lots. (L. 
Kay depo at p. 69.) Because obtaining timely releases of lots was 
of such critical importance to the entire operation, plaintiffs 
discussed the question of lot releases in some detail with 
Southwick at the closing of the transaction. Each of the plain-
tiffs testified that the subject of lot releases was discussed at 
the closing prior to the signing of the trust de€>d, and that 
Southwick had represented to plaintiffs that lots would be 
released if the letters of credit were called, the same as for any 
other payments of principal. Plaintiffs further testified that 
they were familiar with contracts in which lot release provisions 
were enforceable only when the trustors were not in default. In 
fact, the contract under which plaintiffs had purchased the 
property from Clive Sprouse contained such a provision. (L. Kay 
depo at pp. 53-54.) 
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The trust deed and trust deed note in this case were prepared 
by or at the direction of Summit, and accordingly, must be 
construed in favor of plaintiffs. In addition, contracts which 
provide for the partial release of a mortgage on specific lots or 
parcels are generally interpreted more strongly against the party 
required to give the release. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 
1107 (Utah 1982). To the extent that the partial release provi-
sion is ambiguous or uncertain, the Court should consider the 
testimony of the parties as to what the contract meant. 
Oberhanslv v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
Application of these principles to the instant case compels 
the conclusion that plaintiffs were entitled to a release of the 
lots claimed. Although Summit could have easily inserted a 
provision in the trust deed to provide that plaintiffs would not 
be entitled to reconveyances if they were otherwise in default, 
Summit failed to do so. Summit, in addition, represented to 
plaintiffs that they would be entitled to reconveyances if 
payments were made through calling of the letters of credit. 
Courts that have considered the issue have generally held 
that a party is entitled to lot releases under a mortgage not-
withstanding that he may be in default of other provisions unless 
the mortgage specifically provides otherwise. E.g., Harada v. 
Burns, 50 Hawaii 528, 588, 445 P.2d 376, 379 (1968); see also 
13 
Annot. , Construction of provision in real-estate mortgage, land 
contract or other security instrument for release of separate 
parcels of land as payments are made, 41 A.L.R. 3d 7, 67 (1972). 
This Court should hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs 
were entitled to a reconveyance of at least 12 lots on January 10, 
1985, and are entitled to an appropriate award of damages by 
reason of defendants1 failure to release those lots. In the 
alternative, this case should be remanded for the taking of 
evidence to determine what was the parties1 intention with respect 
to release of lots at the time the trust deed was executed. 
POINT II 
THE JUNE 2, 1985 DEMAND FOR RELEASE OF 7 LOTS 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendants claimed before the District Court that the June 2, 
1985 demand for release of 7 lots constituted a compromise and 
settlement of the prior demand for release of 12 lots. The 
District Court accepted defendants' argument and entered summary 
judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 breach of contract and other 
claims related to the failure to timely release lots (Counts II, 
V, VI and VII). The District Court's ruling was clearly er-
roneous. First, defendants failed to plead accord and satisfac-
tion as an affirmative defense. Second, the record in this case 
clearly establishes material factual disputes as to whether there 
14 
was an accord and satisfaction. Third, even ignoring the evidence 
offered by plaintiffs, the evidence offered by defendants in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment was insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish an accord and satisfaction. Fourth, 
any agreement which was reached was executory only, and defendants 
failed to release the lots within the time required by any such 
executory accord. These arguments will be addressed in order. 
A. Defendants Failed To Plead Accord And Satisfaction As An 
Affirmative Defense. 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which must 
be specifically pleaded. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); Hintze v. Seaich, 
20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202, 207-08 (1968). No claim of accord 
and satisfaction appeared in defendant's Answer. The claim 
appeared for the first time in defendant's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 563-66.) 
Defendants have claimed in response to plaintiffs' post-
judgment motions that the claim of accord and satisfaction was 
pleaded in that it was embraced within the defendants' Second and 
Fifth Affirmative Defenses. Those defenses provide as follows: 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the 
doctrine of waiver. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
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All of defendants1 obligations under the 
agreements and understandings of the parties 
have been met, 
(R. 267.) 
Defendants claim that accord and satisfaction is embraced 
within these affirmative defenses because an accord and satisfac-
tion is similar to a waiver and because a reference to defendants 
having met their obligations under the agreements and understand-
ings of the parties includes having met their obligations under 
any settlement agreements. These arguments are simply without 
merit. No reasonable person would understand from a reading of 
these defenses that defendants would rely on a claim of accord and 
satisfaction. It is clear that even defendants did not believe 
these defenses to include accord and satisfaction because the 
claim was never raised until their Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Where defendants had failed to properly plead accord and 
satisfaction, it was error for the Court to grant summary judgment 
on that ground. 
B* Material Issues Of Fact Exist With Respect To The Claim 
of Accord And Satisfaction. 
Because the claim of accord and satisfaction was not raised 
until after most of the discovery had been completed, no discovery 
was addressed specifically to that issue. All the evidence in the 
16 
record establishes, nevertheless, that plaintiffs1 demands for lot 
releases were consistent. Plaintiffs demanded the full number of 
lots to which they were entitled by reason of the principal paid 
both before and after the July 1, 1986 release of 7 lots. The 
evidence clearly supports the inference that defendants released 
those 7 lots because defendants finally acknowledged that plain-
tiffs were entitled to the release of at least that many lots. 
There is no evidence that plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their 
claim for the remaining lots. Plaintiffs continued to demand the 
release of the remaining lots to which they are entitled, and at 
no time did defendants ever object to or respond to those demands 
by claiming that an accord and satisfaction had been reached. 
Lawrence Kay and Robert Kay each testified with respect to 
the release of lots as follows: 
On or about January 10, 1985 Affiant sent the 
letter marked as Exhibit 13 to L. Kayfs 
deposition herein to Summit. Affiant has 
personal knowledge that Summit received the 
aforementioned letter within a matter of days 
following January 10, 1985 because Southwick 
so advised Affiant in conversations which 
Affiant had with Southwick at that time and 
subsequently. During and throughout the 
period commencing approximately January 1, 
1985 and ending June 30, 1985, Affiant had 
numerous telephone conversations with 
Southwick in which Affiant demanded the 
release of lots. Southwick denied Summit had 
any obligation to provide plaintiffs with 
releases of lots until approximately May 1, 
1985, but he thereafter repeatedly ack-
nowledged Summit's obligation to provide 
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plaintiffs with such releases and repeatedly 
promised Affiant that Summit would promptly 
provide such releases. However, plaintiffs 
were never provided with any such release 
until after July 1, 1985. In early May, 1985 
Affiant advised Southwick that plaintiffs had 
a sale for the Yellow Hills Project and that 
plaintiffs would have to have lots released to 
effectuate such sale. In late May and early 
June, 1985, Affiant advised Southwick that 
plaintiffs would have to have the lots 
released in time to meet a closing date of not 
later than June 24, 1985. 
Affidavit of Lawrence C. Kay, para. 17 (R. 503-04); Affidavit of 
Robert L. Kay, para. 17 (R. 528-29) (emphasis added). 
A reasonable inference from these statements, which were made 
before defendants first raised the claim of accord and satisfac-
tion, is that Summit released the 7 lots because Summit had 
determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to the release of 
those lots, and not as a compromise of a greater claim. The 
statements are further supported by the testimony of Robert Kay 
given in his deposition on June 11, 1986, which again was before 
the claim of accord and satisfaction had been raised. In connec-
tion with questioning concerning the June 2, 1985 demand for 
release of 7 lots, Mr. Kay testified as follows: 
Q What did you do ^ with that letter? 
Did you prepare it on or about the date, June 
2? 
A Yeah. Well, he had already agreed 
to release those lots by the time this letter 
18 
Q Who is "he"? 
A Southwick. We flipped over the 
phone for the release of those lots. He said 
his lawyer said I wasn't — after great 
research, they figured I was entitled to six 
and a half lots. But I will flip you for the 
seven. So he had a coin on his end of the 
phone, and flipped it, and I won, I got the 
seventh. I told him then what lots I wanted. 
This was in the middle of May. I called him 
back, wanting to know where they were. And he 
said something that it got one wrong or 
something, so I just typed that to make sure 
he knew which ones I wanted, and mailed it to 
him. 
Robert Kay deposition, June 11, 1986, at p. 47, 1. 10-24.3 
Further evidence which supports the inference that the 
parties did not understand themselves to have reached an accord 
and satisfaction by the July 1, 1985 release of lots, is the fact 
that they continued to negotiate for the release of the remaining 
3This is further supported by the testimony of Robert Kay in 
his deposition on December 12, 1986. After again describing the 
telephone conversation referred to in the quotation in the main 
text, Robert Kay testified as follows: 
Q Did you agree to accept the six lots? 
A No, but it was — well, I agreed to 
get the seven lots to me. I wanted seven. 
But he still had the others that he owed to 
us. But for the meantime it was better than 
nothing. 
Robert Kay deposition, December 12, 1986, at p. 53, 1. 11-15. Due 
to an error of the court reporter, this deposition was not filed 
with the District Court until after plaintiffs filed their Notice 
of Appeal. Plaintiffs have filed a motion to have the deposition 
made a part of the record in this matter. 
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lots. On July 29, 1985, plaintiffs' then counsel sent a letter to 
J. Scott Beuhler, counsel for Summit Systems, demanding the 
release of an additional 7 lots. (L. Kay depo at p. 162, Ex. 19.) 
Lawrence Kay also sent a personal letter to Val Southwick which 
also demanded the release of lots. (L. Kay depo at p. 165, Ex. 
20.) There is no evidence that any of these demands were met with 
the response that the matter had already been settled, and in 
fact, as a result of these demands, the parties later reached a 
tentative settlement agreement involving the release of the lots. 
(L. Kay depo at p. 165, 1. 15-24.) 
The evidence before the District Court, viewed as required in 
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, clearly supports the 
inference, and in fact establishes without dispute, that the 
parties never intended to reach an accord and satisfaction. The 7 
lots were released on July 1, 1985, because defendants ack-
nowledged an obligation to release those lots, not as a compromise 
of a greater claim. The District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the claim of accord and satisfaction. 
C. Defendants1 Evidence Is Insufficient As A Matter Of Law 
To Establish An Accord And Satisfaction. 
The preceding subpoints establish that defendants did not 
properly plead accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense, 
and in any event, there were material issues of fact precluding a 
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ruling by summary judgment on the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction. Even ignoring the pleading defects and the substan-
tial evidence in plaintiffs1 favor cited above, however, the 
evidence before the District Court was insufficient as a matter of 
law to establish an accord and satisfaction. The high level of 
proof required to establish an accord and satisfaction was 
recently reaffirmed by this Court as follows: 
A party seeking to establish an accord 
and satisfaction bears the burden of proof and 
must demonstrate the existence of declarations 
"of such a clear nature as to assure that the 
parties are aware of the extent and scope of 
such agreement.,f 
Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1987), 
quoting Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277 
(Utah 1980). 
An illustration of the degree of proof required is found in 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1975) . The Court stated as follows: 
The authorities dealing with this problem . . 
. uniformly affirm that it must clearly appear 
that the parties so understood and entered 
into a new and substitute contract. To state 
the matter in traditional contract language: 
that there was a definite meeting of the minds 
on such an agreement. Further; when a party 
asserts that his debt has been discharged by 
paying a lesser amount in accord and satisfac-
tion of the entire debt, that is an affirma-
tive defense upon which he has the burden of 
proof. 
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535 P.2d at 1230 (emphasis added). 
In Tates, the defendant had agreed to purchase a bus from the 
plaintiff, but the bus was not delivered when promised. The 
defendant made an oral claim for an adjustment by reason of 
expenses incurred by the defendant as a result of the delay, and 
later followed up that oral claim with a letter and a check for 
payment of the amount due less the amount of the expenses. The 
plaintiff subsequently sued for the balance of the amount due, and 
the defendant claimed the suit was barred by an accord and 
satisfaction. The trial court held that there was an accord and 
satisfaction, but the Supreme Court reversed, noting as follows: 
[I]t cannot fairly and justly be concluded 
that there was any point at which it was 
clearly brought home to the plaintiff that it 
was agreeing to accept the check, less the 
claimed expenses listed by the defendant, as a 
full settlement for the purchase price of the 
bus. Accordingly, the finding of an accord 
and satisfaction and the judgment based 
thereon are in error. 
535 P.2d at 1231-32. 
The evidence in this case offered by defendants was similarly 
insufficient as a matter of law. The only "evidence" referred to 
in the portion of defendants' Reply Memorandum which raised the 
accord and satisfaction claim was the statements of Lawrence Kay 
and Robert Kay quoted above in subpoint B of this Point. The 
testimony was offered only for the proposition that Summit ini-
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tially denied any obligation to reconvey any lots. Defendants 
cite to no other evidence in support of their claim of accord and 
satisfaction, but apparently rely solely on the fact that plain-
tiffs subsequently requested, and defendants reconveyed, a lesser 
number of lots. 
Specifically lacking was any evidence that it was "clearly 
brought home" to the plaintiffs that they were agreeing to accept 
the 7 lots as a compromise of their prior claim for 12 lots. Even 
if viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, which is the 
opposite of what should have been done on this motion for summary 
judgment, the evidence in this case was weaker than that rejected 
by this Court in Tates. The judgment of the District Court 
"finding" that an accord and satisfaction had been reached is 
clearly in error and should be reversed. 
D. If An Agreement Was Reached It Was An Executory Accord, 
The Terms Of Which Were Breached By Defendants. 
An accord and satisfaction should be contrasted with an 
executory accord, which "is an agreement that an existing claim 
shall be discharged in the future by the rendition of a sub-
stituted performance." 6 Corbin Contracts § 1269 at 75 (1962), 
quoted in Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983). 
Under an executory accord, the existing claim is not discharged 
until the new agreement is fully and properly performed. Id. 
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The question of whether a given set of facts constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction or an executory accord is a question of 
fact for the jury. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 
730, 733 n.4 (Utah 1985). 
The Court in this matter found that the parties had reached 
an accord and satisfaction. The evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, just as readily supports the 
inference that the parties reached an executory accord, under 
which the plaintiffs agreed to accept seven lots in satisfaction 
of their existing claim for more lots, but only if those seven 
lots were released within the time constraints imposed by the 
Clive Sprouse contract. Defendants failed to release the lots 
within the time required under the terms of the executory accord. 
Plaintiffs were then entitled to elect to proceed either upon 
their original claim or the accord. L & A Drywall, Inc. v. 
Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). Whether 
such an executory accord existed, and whether it was breached 
were, as stated above, questions of fact not appropriate for 
resolution by summary judgment. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANTS5 FAILURE TO RELEASE LOTS UNTIL 
AFTER JUNE 24, 1985, WAS A BREACH OF THE 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Plaintiffs have established in Point I of this brief that 
they were entitled to a reconveyance of 12 lots in January, 1985. 
Although defendants dispute that contention, defendants did 
acknowledge on approximately May 1, 1985, that plaintiffs were 
entitled to the release of some lots and accordingly agreed to 
reconvey 7 lots. Plaintiffs soon thereafter advised defendants 
that they had a firm offer to purchase the entire subdivision, but 
the offer was contingent upon the release of 7 lots by June 24, 
1985. Plaintiffs confirmed defendants1 agreement to release the 7 
lots by sending a written request for the release of those lots to 
Summit on June 2, 1985. 
Notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiffs needed to 
have the lots released by June 24, 1985 in order to effectuate a 
sale of the entire subdivision, defendants failed to release those 
lots until approximately July 1, 1985. As a result of the delay, 
the offer to purchase the subdivision expired by its own terms, 
and the offeror declined to renew the offer. 
Defendants attempted to justify the failure to timely release 
lots by demonstrating that Summit made a request for reconveyance 
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within the thirty-day period prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-
33. That statute states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Any beneficiary under such trust deed who 
refuses to request a reconveyance from the 
trustee for a period of thirty days after 
written demand therefor is made by the trustor 
or his successor in interest shall be liable 
to the trustor or his successor in interest, 
as the case may be, for double damages 
resulting from such refusal . . . . 
.This statute does not apply for at least two reasons. First, 
although defendants did make a request for reconveyance within 
thirty days of the June 2, 1985 letter, there had already been a 
prior written request for reconveyance of the lots, made January 
10, 1985. The request for reconveyance clearly was not timely 
with respect to the January 10, 1985 letter. 
More importantly, however, the statute only prescribes 
certain minimum standards which must be met by the beneficiaries. 
There is implied in every contract a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795, 
801 (Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Is out, 657 P. 2d 
293, 306 (Utah 1982). Even though the statute may have imposed an 
outside limit of thirty days for making a request for recon-
veyance, defendants had an obligation under the unique facts and 
circumstances of this case to reconvey the lots by the June 24, 
1985 deadline. Defendants had acknowledged approximately May 1, 
1985, that they had an obligation to reconvey the lots. In the 
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middle of May, 1985, Southwick, acting on behalf of defendants, 
specifically agreed to reconvey 7 lots, and Robert Kay specified 
which lots were requested. The June 2, 1985 letter was merely a 
formality to confirm the agreement made in mid-May. (Robert Kay 
deposition, June 11, 1986, at p. 47, 1. 15-24.) 
In addition Summit was aware of the critical importance to 
plaintiffs of having the lots released by June 24, 1985. Under 
these circumstances, Summit had a duty which was greater than the 
minimum duties imposed by the written contract and the statute. 
Summit breached that duty by failing to arrange for a reconveyance 
of lots prior to June 24, 1985. This case should be remanded for 
a determination of the damages suffered by plaintiffs by reason of 
that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON COUNT I OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, WHICH 
SOUGHT REFORMATION ON THE GROUNDS OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY. 
The District Court dismissed Count I of plaintiffs1 Com-
plaint, which alleged that the trust deed and trust deed note were 
unconscionable and sought reformation in order to make them 
conscionable. As grounds for the dismissal, the District Court 
stated as follows: 
The parties willingly entered into negotia-
tions over the loan. The final terms were 
well understood by all and were specifically 
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agreed to by plaintiffs. Count I is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 945.) 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the District Court 
misapprehended the elements of unconscionability, and that 
plaintiffs1 claim of unconscionability was not susceptible of 
disposition by summary judgment. 
Two recent Utah cases considered the issue of unconscionabil-
ity . Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock 
Company Inc. , 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). In both cases, this Court 
reversed a trial court finding of unconscionability; however, each 
decision was based upon the unique facts and circumstances of the 
case, which are materially different from the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case at bar. 
These cases describe unconscionability as having two com-
ponent parts, procedural and substantive, each of which must be 
assessed in the light of the circumstances of the particular case: 
"Unconscionable" is a term that defies 
precise definition. Rather, a court must 
assess the circumstances of each particular 
case in light of the two-fold purpose of the 
doctrine, prevention of oppression and of 
unfair surprise. [Citation] Recognition of 
these purposes has led to an analysis of 
unconscionability in terms of "substantive" 
and "procedural" unconscionability. "Substan-
tive unconscionability" examines the relative 
fairness of the obligations assumed. "Proce-
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dural unconscionability" focuses on the manner 
in which the contract was negotiated and the 
circumstances of the parties. 
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041. 
Procedural unconscionability exists where there has been an 
absence of meaningful choice. Among the factors considered by the 
courts in determining whether a party has had a meaningful choice 
are the relative expertise of the party, excessive price or 
interest, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights 
imposed by the bargain, and a lack of opportunity for meaningful 
negotiation. Bekins, 664 P.2d at 462. See also Resource Manage-
ment, 706 P.2d at 1042. 
There is ample evidence in this case which would support a 
finding of procedural unconscionability. Plaintiffs are relative-
ly inexperienced in real estate developments and had never 
previously entered into a transaction of this magnitude. Plain-
tiffs had been assured that financing would be readily available 
from Summit and had been advised that the interest rate would be 
approximately 10%, together with an approximately 10% discount. 
In reliance on these representations, plaintiffs had terminated 
their efforts to obtain alternative financing. Summit delayed the 
closing for several months, with the result that the underlying 
obligations went into default, and plaintiffs were in a position 
of having to either refinance or face foreclosure. It was not 
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until the closing, however, that plaintiffs first learned that the 
interest rate would be 17%, together with a discount of ap-
proximately 17%. Although plaintiffs may have understood the 
terms of the contract, they nevertheless held no meaningful 
opportunity for negotiation because the precise proposed terms had 
not been disclosed until closing, and plaintiffs further had no 
meaningful choice because they had abandoned efforts to obtain 
alternative financing in reliance upon the promise and expectation 
of financing from Summit at the 10% terms initially discussed. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that there exists evidence which was 
cited to the District Court by defendants which would tend to 
refute each of the above statements. The resolution of those 
factual disputes is clearly not appropriate on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Substantive unconscionability is also present in this case. 
The relevant factors are as follows: 
Substantive unconscionability is indi-
cated by contract terms so one-sided as to 
oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent 
party, an overall imbalance in the obligations 
and rights imposed by the bargain, excessive 
price, or significant cost-price disparity. . 
[T]he terms are to be evaluated in the 
light of a general commercial background and 
the commercial needs of the particular trade 
or case. . . . [T]he test is whether the terms 
are so extreme as to appear unconscionable 
according to the mores and business practices 
of the time and place. 
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Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-42 (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
The record contains testimony from individuals knowledgeable 
concerning the real estate and financial circumstances in the 
Vernal area that the interest rate charged by Summit was un-
reasonably high (deposition of Clive Sprouse at pp. 4, 27), and 
the overall terms of the transaction were unfair. (Deposition of 
Bob Dearman at pp. 26, 3 3.) Although high interest rates may be 
appropriate under some circumstances, the appraised value of the 
subdivision, $1,518,000.00, was more than double the amount 
actually loaned, $667,000.00, plus plaintiffs had posted addition-
al security in the form of letters of credit totalling 
$280,000.00. 
Plaintiffs again acknowledge that contrary inferences may be 
drawn from the evidence in the record. The resolution of those 
conflicts should have been made only after a full trial on the 
merits. 
In Bekins, this Court reversed a trial court finding of 
unconscionability where the interest rate was 36.3%. In that 
case, however, the loans were clearly high risk. The borrower was 
struggling through a bankruptcy, and there was already a first 
mortgage against the property for 1.1 million dollars. In the 
instant case, in contrast, there is evidence which supports the 
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inference that the loan was more than adequately secured and could 
not be considered high risk. 
The equitable determination of whether a contract is uncon-
scionable depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each 
case, and should be made only after a full hearing on the merits. 
The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, would support a finding of unconscionability, and the 
District Court erred in granting defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment of the District Court should be reversed 
and the matter remanded for trial on the merits. 
DATED this ,/G^ day of September, 1987. 
i <^&x^~-
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUN 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY, and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
C i v i l No. 86-CV-48U 
The parties willingly entered into negotiations over the loan. 
The final terms were well understood by all and were specifically 
agreed to by Plaintiffs. Count I is hereby dismissed with pre-
judice. 
The Court is not persuaded that a beneficiary of an agreement 
owes any fiduciary duty to the Trustor. Plaintiff has cited no 
authority to the contrary. Count III is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
This Court will not recognize a cause of action for tortious 
breach of implied covenant and fair dealing. Court IV is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
The Court having dismissed Counts III and IV finds nothing to 
sustain Plaintiffs' Claim for punitive damages. Count VIII is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
The remaining Counts, II, V, VI and VII, are dependant upon 
Plaintiffs1 claim of wrongful refusal to release lots. Plain-
tiffs1 claim this is based upon a letter dated January 10, 1985. 
Defendants claim the matter was compromised and a new letter was 
sent on June 2, 1985 demanding the release of seven (7) lots. 
There is no dispute that the seven (7) lots were released within 
thirty (30) days of that demand. 
The facts as admitted by both sides show the Plaintiffs 
making payments late or failing to make payments with the result 
that the "additional security'1 was utilized. There was a dispute 
whether lots could be released. The June 2, 1985 letter is an 
abandonment of the earlier and greater claim for releases and does 
constitute a compromise and the subsequent release constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction. The Court does not find a failure on the 
part of the Defendants. Counts II, V, VI and VII are also 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Richard W. Giauque 
Ray G. Martineau 
Robert M. Anderson 
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TRUST DEED 
With Assigpnrrient of Rents 
THIS TRUST D E E D , made this . _^ . ' J?** . . . day of J a n u a r y . , 3 9..8A. 
between Lawr.enc.e...C......Kay. and ..J.oy...Kay. 
Rohe.r£..L.....Kay and ..Teresa..Kay ... as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 1940...East..2500-.South N a p l e s Utah 84078 
(Sl»«-»l »ni n u m W r l ICUrJ ( S l . l t ) 
J- - . . . .Scot t : . . . B u e h l . e r . . : , „s T R U S T E E / and 
S u m m i t . . S y . s t e r n s . . . I n c . , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO T R U S T E E IN TRUST. 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in . U i n t a h 
County\ State of Utah: 
'Lots 1 through 95 inclusive of Plat "A" YELLOW HILL ESTATES 
SUBDIVISION, excluding Lots 10, 20 & 28-34. Lots 1 through 
51 inclusive of Plat ,1BM YELLOW HILL ESTATES SUBDIVISION;3 
being located in the West half of Section 18, Township A South, 
Range 21 East, Salt Lake meridan. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and a)) wafer rights, righls of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereduaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given "to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory hole of even date herewith, in the principal *um of $.. 8 0 6 . , . 0 0 0 - O Q . . , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the perfonnance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced bv Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
"NOTE: Tru»lrr mui! b* a mcmiwr of the I ' u h Stale- Bar; a bank, building and loan association or iavin;» 
and loan ajiortation authorised to do »uch busirx-u in Utah; a corporation aulhoriit-d to do a lru*i Luwinru in 
Utah; ox a lillc in»maj\ce or abstract company aulhoriicd to do »uch bui inni in U u h . 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY O^ T»»* u t u a * ~ , - f c ~, . . .v 
\ T o k e e p »aid p r o p e r l y in f ' condi t ion and rrpair*. not lo rrmovr or <* * . sh a n y bu i ld ing thereon, tft 
c o m p l e t e or restore prontptl> and gOitd and w o r k m a n l i k e , m a n n e r any l»i ttf w | u t h n i a y be cnnsirurh-d. 
d a m a g e d or d e s t r o y e d t h e r e u n ; to r o m p l y with all l a * * , covenant* ami M M I . . ..<tn», ;ill.-»*lii»c saul properly; nol 
to c o m m i t i>r prrmil vo*i . • thetruf , not tu l o m m i l , sulfer or prrmit any art uj*»n taiil p r o p e r t y in v i..l.iti..n of I J * . If. 
d o all other ar i s whu h from IIM» r h a r j i i c r or use of said proper ly m u v !»•• r e a s o n a b l y nrrr*<**iv. the specific 
e n u m e r a t i o n s here in nut e n l u d i n s , ' Ihe genera l , and . if tin- loan M i u r e d herehy or tiny |»arl il.r-/.-*tf is Iwii.c i.b-
Lamed /or the purpo*c of f inanc ing Construction of i m p r o v e m e n t * on *.aiJ p r o p e r l y . T r u s t o r l u r l h r r agrees/. 
(a) T o rnmmcnr i ' ron*lrui ibm p r n m p l l y am) lo purMic » m c wi th rr. ivnnahle d i l i g e n c e lo comple t ion 
in accordance with p l a n s and S|KCifirations sat i s factory to B e n e f i c i a r y , ond 
(b) T o allow B e n e f i c i a r y l o inspect sa id p r o p r r l y al all l i n n s dur ing c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
T r u s t e e , u p o n p r e s e n t a t i o n to it of an affidavit s i gned by B e n e f i c i a r y . *r thnu forth for i* >.ho*inc. a default 
b y Trus tor under this n u m b e r e d p a r a g r a p h , is authori/.t-d to accept as true anil o i n i l u ^ i v f all f a c u ami state-
m e n t s there in , and lo aci thereon h e r e u n d e r . 
2 . T o ' p r o v i J r and m a i n t a i n i n s u r a n c e , of such lyp«* «»r type* and i m n u n N a** Mrnrf i r inry m a y n i j u i r e . nn 
t h e improvement* m m exiNlme, or hereaf ter ercchxJ or p laced on saul p r o p r r i t . Sot h H I M I M I K V >>h.ill U« carried 
in c o m p a n i e s approt%*il h> B e n e f i c i a r y v*ith h»»s p a y a b l e rhiu>e» in favor o | ami in lurm o . r e p i . i h l e to I lenef ic iary. 
In event of loss . Trustor shal l pvi» i m m e d i a t e n n l u r to l l r n e f i e i a r y . u h o mny »i..k»- pi.M.I «,f !.#«»%, a n d ea» h in>u ranee 
c o m p a n y concerned is h e r e b y a u l h n r u e d and d irected to m a k e p a y m e n t for MIIII l«*xs d i n - v i l y In II. n e f a i a r y 
in>i. ad »»f lo TruNior ami B e n e f i c i a r y jo int ly , and the in%uranee pr.»«»«U. or a n y part thereo f . m a \ he appl ied 
b y Benef i c iary , at its o p t i o n , l o reduct ion of i h c i n d e b t e d n e s s h e r e b y s*vureJ ur l o t h e res torat ion or repair ol 
t h e proper ly d a m a g e d 
3. T o de l iver in. pa»* for a n d m a i n t a i n wi th B e n e f i e i a r y until thr indebtednes s *eruriv) h e r e b y is paid in full, 
s u c h ev idence of iiih* as U e m f n i a r y m a y require , inc lud ing al»tract> ol l i i l e or tvolieie* i»l t i t le insurance and 
a n y ex tens ions or renewal* thereof or s u p p l e m e n t s thereto . 
4. T o appear in and d e f e n d a n y act ion or p r o c e e d i n c purport ing tu affect the s e c u r i t y hereof, the t it le to 
M i d proper ly , or the r ights or power* of Benef i c iary or T r u s t e e , and should IU nefo- iury or Trus tee elect to 
a l so appear in or d e f e n d a n y »och action or proceed inn. to pay all r n s u and e x p e n s e s , inc lud ing tost of evi-
d e n c e of title and at torney's fees in a reasonable s u m incurred by Benef i c iary or T r u s t e e . 
5. T o pay at least 10 d a y s before d e l i n q u e n c y all taxes and ossessmenLs a f fec t ing sa i d proper ly , including 
all a s s e s s m e n t s upon water c o m p a n y slock and all rents , a s sessments and charprs f».r w a t e r , appurtenant to or 
used in connec t ion with said p r o p e r t y , to pay . w h e n d u e . alt e n c u m b r a n c e s , c h a r p e s . a n J l i ens w n h interest , 
o n said property or any part thereof , which at any t u n e appear to be prior or super ior h e r e t o ; to pay all cosU. 
f ees , and e i p e n s e s of this T r u s t . 
6 Should Trustor fail l o m a k e a n y p a y m e n t or l o do any acl as here in p r o v i d e d , then Beneficiary or 
T r u s t e e , but without ob l iga t ion so to do and without not ice to or d e m a n d u p o n T r u s t o r and vsiihnut re leas ing 
T r u s t o r from arty obl igat ion hereof , m a y : Make or do the same in such m a n n e r and lo s u c h extent as either m a y 
A^~m n M - n m r v to n i n i f f l the i r r u r i l v Vwreof BeneftCiarv or T r u s t e e boLnr l u i h o r i n - H In enter unnn iaul 
nece»sary therelor . inc luding cost oi ev idence ol l i l l e . e m p l o y counse l , and pay his r e a s o n a b l e fees. 
7. T o pay i m m e d i a t e l y and without d e m a n d all sums e x p e n d e d h e r e u n d e r b y B e n e f i c i a r y or Trus tee , 
wi th interest from da le of e x p e n d i t u r e al the rate of ten per cent ()0r~«) per a n n u m unti l paid, and the repay* 
inent thereof shall be s ecured h e r e b y . 
I T IS M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D T H A T : 
fl. Should said p r o p e r l y or a n y part thereof be taken or d a m a g e d by reason of a n y public improvement 
or c o n d e m n a t i o n prorve i i n g . or d a m a g e d by fire, or earthquake , or in any other m a n n e r . Benef ic iary shall be 
ent i t led to all c o m p e n s a t i o n , awards , and other pa>-menU or relief therefor, and shall be ent i t led al iLs option 
Lo currunenc-e. appear in and prosecute in ils own n a m e , any action or p r o r e e d i n g i . or m make nny tornpro 
mi se or se t t lement , in connec t ion wjih such taking or d a m a g e . All such Compensat ion , a w a r d s , damages , n r h l s 
of action and proceed* inc luding Ihe proceed* ol Mny pol ic ies of fire and Olh««r in surance affecting naid property, 
are hereby assigned to b e n e f i c i a r y , w h o m a y . after deduct ing therefrom alt its e x p e n s e s , inc luding attorney's fees. 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trus tor acrees to eneru le such further ass ignments of any 
c o m p e n s a t i o n , award, d a m a g e s , and rights of act ion and proceeds as Benef ic iary or T r u s t e r may require. 
9. At any t ime and from t ime to t ime u p o n wri t l ten request of Benef ic iary , p a y m e n t of ils fees and pre-
mentation of this Trus t D e e d a-nd the note for e n d o r s e m e n t (in case of full r e c o n v e y a n c e , for cancellation and 
re tent ion! , without affecting the l iabil ity of any p e r s o n for the p a y m e n t of the i n d e b t e d n e s s secured herehy. 
T r u s t e e may (a) consent to Ihe making of any m a p or plat of said proper ly ; (b) jo in in pranlinp. any e a s e ' 
mrnt or creating any restrict ion thereon; (c) join in any suU.rd ina i ion or o lher a g r e e m e n t af lect ing this Trust Deed 
or the hen or churge thereof, (d) reconvey. without warranty , all or any pari of said proper ly T h e grantee in 
a_ny reconveyance m a y be descr ibed as "the person or persons entit led thereto", and the r» » itals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conc lus ive proof of t ru th fu lnes s thereof. T i u s t o r agrees lo p a y reasonable Trustee'* 
fees ' for any of the serv ices m e n t i o n e d in this paragraph. 
JO. As addit ional aerurity . T r u s t o r hereby a s s i rns Benefit iary. dur inr Ihe c o n t i n u a n c e of tr>ese trusts, all 
rents, i ssues , royalt ies , and profits of the property affected by this Trust D e e d and of a n y personal properly 
located thereon Uot i l T r u H o r shall default in Ihe p a y m e n t of i n v indebtedness s ecured hereby or in the per-
formance of any a g r e e m e n t hereunder . Trus tor shall have th» right to col lect all s u c h r c n U . i isues. royalties 
a_nd profits earned prior lo defaul t as they become due and payable . If Trus tor shal l default as aforesaid. 
Trustor** right lo col lect any of such m o n e y i shall c e a s e and Benef ic iary shall have the right, with or wiihout 
taking possess ion of the property affected hereby , lo col lect alt rents , roya l t i e s , i s sues , and profits. Fai lure or 
d i scont inuance of Bene f i c iary at any time or from t i m e to t t m - to co l l i r t a n y s u c h m o n e y s shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Benef i c iary of l lw right. p*«wcr. *nd author i ty to collect the same. 
Noth ing contained here in , nor tb« exerc i se of the right by Be i . ehc iary I . co l lect , shal l be. or b* construed to 
be . an affirmation by Benef i c iary of any t enancy , lease or option, nor an a s s u m p t i o n of l iability under, nor a 
subordination of the l ien or charge of thi* T r u i t Deed to any such t enancy , l e a s t or op t ion . 
11. Upon any defaul t by Trus tor h e r e u n d e r . Bene f i c iary m a y at a n y t ime w i thout notice, either in 
person, by agent , or by a receiver to be appointed by a courl (Trustor hereby consent ing to the appointment of 
Benef ic iary aj such r e c e i v e r ) . a_nd wi ihoul regard lo Ihe adequacy of any secur i ty for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter u p o n aj*d take possess ion of s-aid proper ly or any pari thereof, tn it* o w n name sue for or 
otherwise collect s-sid rents , iksues. and profits, inc luding those- past dur and u n p a i d , and apply the same lesa 
c o s u and expense* of operat ion and col lect ion, inc luding reasonable attorney'a fees , u p o n any indebtedness 
•-ecured hereby , a-nd in auch order a j Bcnef:Liary m a y de termine . 
12. T h e entering- u p o n and taking possess ion of said property , the co l l ec lon of auch rents, i u u o , and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other _invjrtr.ee pol ic ies , o; c o m p e n s a t i o n or awards for any lakinr or 
d a m a g e of **id proper ly , and the appl icat ion or re lease thereof as aforesaid , shal l not cure or waive any 
default or notice of de fau l t hereunder or inval idate a n y acl done pursuant to auch not ice . 
13. T h e failure o n the part of Bene f i c iary lo prompt ly enforce any right h e r e u n d e r shall not operate aa 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Benef ic iary of any default shall not c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of any otlrcr 
or subserquent default . 
14. T i m e is of the e s sence hereof. U p o n defaul t by T r u s t o r in ihe p a y m e n t of mny indebtedness *ccured here-
by or in the performance of a n y a g r e e m e n t hereunder , al) sums secured hereby shal l immedia te ly become due 
and payable at the opt ion of Benef ic iary . In the event of such default . Bene f i c iary m a y e x e c u t e or cause Trustee 
to execute a wri t ten not ice of default and of e lect ion t o cause said property to be sold lo satisfy the obligations 
hereof and T r u s t e e shal l file such not ice lor record i n each county w h e r e i n said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is s i tuated . Benef ic iary a lso shaJJ depos i t with T r u s t e e , the note and all documents evidencing 
expendi ture* aecurtrd hereby . 
]k
*
 D u f o n
 S » * c - l h « l o » n e v i d e n c e d by the n o t e s e c u r e d h e r e b y w i s Bade i n r e l i a n c e upon T r u s t o r ' s 
c r e d i t and f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y and p r o p e r t y a a a a o e a e n t e x p e r t i s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , i n t h e ewent the Trus tor or i u 
s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t a h a l l e i t h e r t e l l , c o n v e y or a l i e n a t e the h e r e i n d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y or any part t h e r o f , any 
i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n w i t h o u t t h t w r i t t e n p e r a U i i o n o f l e n d e r or bt d i v e s t e d o f t i t l e i n any a a n e r , whether v o l u n t a r i l 
• r i n v o l u n t a r i l y , t h a n t h t f u l l p r i n c i p a l o f t h a Katt a e c u r e d haraby t o o a t h e r n i t h f u l l and a l l o t h e r a a a u n t i d u . 
15. After the UpK of auch Ua a toay u>en DC irqimeo t>y taw iwuwwmf •» ^ « > « i u o n *>i — •- ••«»•*«. w. 
default, a>nd notice of default and no of tale having been jiven as then require • law, Ttui tee , without dnmand 
on Trustor. shall »rll s~aid property 0». Jie d*le and at the time and place dciirna in *«»d notice of kale, etcher »».. 
a *.hole or in separate parcels, and Ln luch order as it may determine (but subject to any slalutory right of Trustor to 
direct Lhe order in which such property, if consislinr of several known lots or parrels, shall be sold). a( public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purcnaae price payable in lawful money of the Untied S u l c i at the time of 
a-aJe. The person conducting the a-ale may. for a-ny cause he deems e*pe<!»ent. tvostpone the sale from time to 
Lu-oe u-nlU It shall be completed aJid. in every case, notice of postponement ahall be rjven by public declaration 
thereof by such peraon at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed 
lor lonter than one d»y beyond the dmy driirniird in tbe notice of »ale. notice thereof ahall be riven in the 
aajnc manner as the original notice of s~ale. Trustee ahall execute and deliver to (he purchaser its Deed con-
veyinf s-aid property ao aold. but without aj*y co-tenant or warranty, caprcsi or Implied. The recital* in the 
Deed of ajiy mailers or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any pervon. including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Truale* ahaJI apply the proceeds o( the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of eiercisinj the power of a-ale sund of the aaJe, including tire payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) COJI of any evidence of Lille procured in connection with such sale and revenue alarnps on Truilee'a Deed; 
(3) aJI sums eipended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at \Qr\ per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all oilier sum* then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to trie person or persons 
legally entitJed thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of auch proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the s-ale look place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
a-rcure-d hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on lead property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and espenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in auch amount as shall be 
fued by the court. 
)7. Beneficiary roay appoint a aucceasor truslc-e at any time by filing for record in th-e office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers;, duties, authority 
MSid title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be ei ecu Led a.nd 
acknowledged, and notice thereof ahall be riven and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
Jfl. This Trust Deed ahall apply to. invie to the benefit ol. and bind all parlict hereto, their heirs. legatee*-, 
drvuwres. adminstrators. e i ecu tors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
•-everaJ The term "Beneficiary" ahall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
re-cord as provided by law. Truster is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding In which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Truster shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trujlre. 
20. This Trust Deed ahall be construed according to the laws of the State of U u h 
2 1 . T h e undcrsig-ned T r u s t o r requests that a c o p y of any not ice of d e f a u l t a n d of a n y notice of »a.le 
h e r e u n d e r be mailed to h i m at the address here inbefore act forth. 
2 1 a . P e r s o n a l Li a b i l i ty. T r u s t o r and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s s h a l l p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r a l l a a o u n t s 
dut under the l o a n s e c u r e d h e r e b y . In t h e e v e n t o f a d e f a u l t due h e r e u n d e r or the Mote or r e l a t e d 
S e c u r i t y I n s t r u m e n t s , B e n e f i c a r y s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o p r o c e e d d i r e c t l y and i a a e d i a t e l y a g a i n s t T r u s t o 
a n d / o r i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s w i t h o u t f i r s t p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t t h e p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h f o r e c l o s u r e or 
o t h e r w i s e and such p r o c e e d i n g i s n o t t o be d e e a e d an i r r e v o c a b l e e l e c t i o n o f r e a e d i e s . 
? l b . Due on C n c u s b e r a n c e . T r u s t o r c o v e n a n t s d u r i n g the t c r a h e r e o f n o t t o e n c u t b e r , a o r t g a g e , p l e d g e 
or h y p o t h e c a t e the p r o p e r t y a s s e c u r i t y f o r a d d i t i o n a l j u n i o r d e b t w i t h o u t w r i t t e n c o n s e n t of the b e n e f i 
and a b r e a c h of t h i s c o v e n a n t s h a l l e n t i t l e l e n d e r , at i t s s o l e o p t i o n , t o d e c l a r e t h e e n t i r e o u t s t a n d i n 
p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t due and p a y a b l e i n f u l l w i t h out d e i a n d or n o t i c e . 
2 2 C 2 3 ( S e e S c h e d u l e a ) SlCKAlURf Of TRUSTOR^.
 ? / / /) / 
-X-
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
Lawrence- KayW ' ' " " ~ " 
-Jfoy^Kay ^ 
(If Truitor am Individual) 
On the . . . _ i 3 r d day of ...: January » A D - 19-84... P«rEonnUy 
appeared before me .^ .a.Y.T. £ ! ) £ . £ . . ^ 
the.pigner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .fc.hey... executed the 
.Varnai •* C
 t 
- -.V \ 
C ° ^ Notary Public residing at: 
, 1 - I - . : - : 
: MylCOrninissioQ.Expirts: 
; \' * •* . , ; : V e r n a l . Utah 
.'•''•.. ^ .1.-. \ - \ ; " ' / 0 * Trustor a Corporation) 
'•SVATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 8S-
On the ..._ day of „., A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me « _
 t who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expirci: 
Notary Public residing at: 
SCHEDULE A 303 
22. Partial Releases. Upon receipt of the 
written request ' of the Trustor, and upon receipt of 
the principal payments hereinafter set forth, the bene-
ficiary shall instruct the Trustee to deliver to the 
Trustor Deeds of Partial Reconveyance as follows: 
(a) Plat* "A": Lots 1 through 27 excluding 
Lots 10, 20, 28, ;29, 30, 31, 32,' 33, and 34 upon receipt 
of $15,000.00 for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(b) Plat "A":
 t ' Lots 35 through 95 upon receipt 
of $13,000.00 principal for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(c) Plat "BM: Lots 1 through 51 upon receipt 
of $5,000.00 principal for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
23. Letter (s) of Credit. As additional security 
for the indebtedness the Trustor has delivered or shall 
deliver to the beneficiary the following irrevocable 
and unconditional letter(s) of credit drawn for the 
Trustor's account: 
Bank: First Security Bank of Utah N.A. 
' ("The first bank") 
Letter of Credit Number:062-060-8980-50005 
Amount: $110,000.00 
Expiration Date: July 10th 1985 
Bank: First Interstate Bank 
r"The second bank") 
Letter of Credit Number:, 2003 and 2004 
Amount:$130,000.00 (#2003) & $40,000.00 (#2004) 
Expiration Date: Both July 10th 1985 
The beneficiary shall have the right to draw upon the 
lecter(s) of credit or any renewal or extension thereof, 
in whole . or in part, upon the occurance of any one 
or more cf the following events: 
(A) 
1. the occurance of any event of default under 
this mortgage; or 
2. The Trustor's failure to deliver to the 
beneficiary, no less than thirty (30) days prior to 
the expiration date of the letter(s) of credit or any 
renewal or extension thereof, a renewal or extension 
of the letter(s) of credit for a term of not less than 
one year; or 
3. Any action by the Trustor or the first or 
second bank which, in the beneficiary's discretion, 
reasonably exercised, may jeopardize its rights to 
draw on the letter(s) of credit; 
(B) Proceeds of any draw upon the letter(s) 
of credit may be applied by the beneficiary to be a 
payment of accrued interest (including any accrued 
interest the payment of which was otherwise deferred), 
late charges, principal (including any pre-payment 
charge occasioned by a principal payment), or any other 
obligation arising out of the Trustor's obligation 
to the beneficiary under this Deed of Trust or the 
Trust Deed Note, in such manner as the beneficiary, 
in its sole discretion, deems appropriate. 
(C) Provided there is no default or condition 
which but for the furnishing of notice or the passage 
of time would constitute an event of default under 
this Trust Deed, the beneficiary shall release its 
rights in the letter(s) of credit and surrender the 
letter(s) of credit to the first and second bank upon 
the principal reduction of the Trust Deed Note as secured 
by this Deed of Trust in the amount of Two Hundred 
Eighty Thousand ($280,000.00) Dollars. 
an January %3' 1984 
For* value receive^, we, or any of us,
 t romlse to pay to SUMMIT 
SYSTEMS, INC. or order, at its above office In Utah, the principal of 
Eight Hundred Six Thousand Dollars ($806,000.00) with interest thereon 
from January ^ 2 X ' ^ , 1984 until paid at the rate of SEVENTEEN (177.) percent 
per annum, both principal and interest payable only in lawful money of 
the United States of America. 
This Note evidences a loan made or to be made by SUMMIT SYSTEMS, 
INC. to Borrower In the principal amount hereof and is secured by a 
Trust Deed or even date herewith. This note is calculated on a daily 
interest basis. 
It is understood and agreed, that the first installment of all 
accured interest shall be due on the 1st day of June, 1984. Then, subsequent 
installments in the amount of ($42,659.37) Forty Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Fifty Nine and 37/100's dollars, including interest, shall be due on 
the 1st day of September 1984, and one of said installments to be paid 
on the 1st day of each and every quarter thereafter until the 1st day 
of December, 1987, at which time the whole of the unpaid principal, 
together with accrued interest, shall be due; each of said quarterly 
installments to be applied first to the payment of accrued interest 
on .the unpaid balance, and the balance thereof to be credited on said 
principal. 
And in case default be made in the payment of any of said installments 
of principal or interest at the times and in the manner aforesaid, then 
such installment or payment, installments, or payments,, so in default, 
shall be added to and become a part of the principal sum, and from the 
date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid it 
shall bear twenty one percent rate of interest as the principal debt, 
or in the performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in the 
Trust Deed securing this note, the holder thereof, at its option, and 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and 
accrued interest due and payable. 
In the event any installment of principal and interest shall remain 
unpaid for a period of 15 days after due, the undersigned, at the option 
of the holder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late charge 
a sum equivalent to FIVE (57.) percent of the principal amount of such 
installment. Default is defined as 15 days late on any payment. 
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without suit, 
the undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay all costs and expenses 
thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally saive presentment 
for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest and of non-payment 
of this note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of time 
of payment that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; and 
also agree that further payments of principal or interest in renewal 
thereof shall not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers. 
In the event the undersigned is unable to pay off the outstanding 
principal and interest due on 12-1-87 due solely to external financial 
conditions affecting this and like property generally, then and only 
then will the lender extend the term for two more years with the following 
conditions strictly met; (1) A 47. modification fee of the outstanding 
balance paid at the time of modification: (2) The quarterly payment 
will increase so as to amortize fully the "outstanding balance due on 
12-1-87 over the two year period ending 12-1-89 at the same rate of 
interest set forth in the note secured hereby: (3) To verify the existence 
of the above mentioned external financial conditions and market conditions 
the Borrower will submit to the Lender written verification that the 
Borrower has been denied re-financing by three commercial banks solely 
because of adverse financial conditions and market conditions generally 
affecting this and like other property. 
R o b e r t L. KaV_x 
'^ts<sr/-tY^S^-
^^^ Lawren€e_Ka 
fl V3oy Kavy 7 e r e s a Kay 
